Intermediated securities: taking stock by McFarlane, B
1 
 
Further Reading: 
Intermediated Securities and the Rights of the Ultimate Investor [2016] 3 JIBFL 153 
Virtual Money in the Virtual Bank [2016] 3 JIBFL 150 
Bearish news for note investors [2015] 5 JIBFL 329 
Intermediated Securities: Taking Stock  
* by Professor Ben McFarlane 
Abstract: 
Ben McFarlane considers the possible impact on the law of intermediated 
securities of some developments in the general law of trusts and of property. 
Key Points: 
 A key feature of the English law of intermediated securities is its 
dependence on the general law of trusts: developments in that general law, 
even if occurring in different contexts, may therefore be of relevance to 
investors in securities. 
 There is some evidence in the general law of trusts of the courts moving 
away from a traditional conceptual approach to a more functional 
approach. 
 Similarly, recent suggestions as to the disintermediation of securities 
holding also call for discussion of the general principles to be applied 
where registered entitlements are lost as a result of fraud. 
 
A feature of a certain strain of Englishness is an optimistic faith in the ability of the 
enthusiastic generalist to rise to the challenges presented by a specific task. Certainly, in 
relation to intermediated securities, English law has eschewed the tailored codes, or statutory 
interventions, favoured in many other jurisdictions, leaving matters to be governed by the 
conceptual poetry of the general law of trusts not the functional prose of, for example, Art 8 
of the UCC. The ultimate investor is not an “entitlement holder”, with specific rights laid out 
as by Art 8; rather, the investor has a beneficial interest, and is thus aligned with, for 
example, a co-owner of a family home.  
There are both strengths and weaknesses in the English approach. As noted, for example, by 
Bloxham ([2014] 5 JIBFL 283, 287), some have doubted whether general rules are fit for a 
world of “complex and rapidly shifting dematerialised interests”. A significant problem 
would arise if the complexity were such as to mean that an investor could not identify any 
specific assets held for his or her benefit by an intermediary: conceptually, it is the relation of 
a duty to specific assets that gives the holder of the correlative right an equitable proprietary 
interest, and thus ensures that he or she is not a mere unsecured creditor. This does not mean, 
however, that segregation is always required: it is possible for A to declare a trust of a 
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freehold of land under which B has a 50% equitable interest, without dividing up the land. As 
first noted by Professor Goode ([2003] LMCLQ 379: see too [2012] 5 JIBFL 272), and as 
adopted in the RASCALS case ([2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) at [232]; [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 
at [69]-[77]), such a possibility is particularly important when dealing with assets such as 
shares: the subject matter of an investor’s beneficial interest can be a proportionate one in an 
intermediary’s entire holding of shares of a particular kind. The fact that interests in such 
assets are “complex and rapidly shifting” is not, in itself, an impediment to identifying an 
investor as a beneficial owner of a proportionate part of such assets. In the RASCALS case, 
indeed, Briggs J went further ([2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) at [239]), finding that certainty of 
subject matter continues to exist even if the intermediary, exercising a power given to it in the 
arrangements with the investor, disposes of particular securities and acquires instead only a 
personal right against a third party to recover equivalent securities. In doing so, he made two 
points which vividly demonstrate the English approach of drawing on the general concepts of 
the law of trusts: first, as shown by, for example, trust interests in a solicitor’s client account 
(see [241]), a personal right can clearly be the subject matter of a trust; second, as shown by 
the “beneficial ownership of matrimonial and other shared homes”, a beneficial interest can 
exist even if there are factual uncertainties, at any particular time, as to its precise extent (the 
same point could also be made by drawing on the law of mutual wills). Such a technique can 
also be seen in Lord Neuberger’s invocation of the floating charge when finding that it is 
possible for the subject matter of a proprietary estoppel claim to change over time (Thorner v 
Major [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776 at [95]): after all, the term “fund”, in its 
financial sense, derives from the Latin for a piece of land. 
It thus seems that a long-standing concern as to the applicability of general trusts concepts to 
intermediated securities  has now been addressed. The Financial Markets Law Commission, 
in its 2004 Report, also emphasised that the “[m]odern thinking is that an investor’s claim 
should in general lie only against its own intermediary, with no look-through to upper-tier 
intermediaries or the issuer”. The general law of trusts captures this point precisely: if, for 
example, A holds on trust for B1, and B1 then declares a sub-trust in favour of B2, then B2’s 
rights are against B1 rather than against A. It would not make conceptual sense if B1 were to 
“drop out”, or if B1’s own beneficial interest were to cease to exist, as that beneficial interest 
is the very subject matter of the trust in favour of B2 (see e.g. Nelson v Greening & Sykes 
[2007] EWCA Civ 1358 at [47]-[57]). The recent confirmation of the general “no-look-
through” principle in Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) and 
re Public Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank ‘Privatbank’ [2015] EWHC 3299 (Ch) has, 
however, raised concerns as to the precarious position of an ultimate investor (see e.g. [2016] 
3 JIBFL 153), which can be weakened by contractual terms which limit the liability of upper-
tier intermediaries, or give them wide powers to deal with securities, for example by using 
sub-custodians (see Micheler [2015] CLJ 505). Certainly, if there is a perception by an 
ultimate investor that he or she is the “owner” of the underlying asset, with direct rights 
against an issuer, this is at odds with the conceptual position under English law (by way of 
contrast, compare e.g. the position in Japan under the BETA regime whereby only the 
account holder in the lowest tier is regarded as having a property interest). We can consider 
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three possible responses to this disjunction between the investor’s misconception and the 
conceptual position. 
First, one method of aligning expectations and practice is to alter the former, by emphasising 
the limited nature of the rights of an ultimate investor: whilst the proprietary protection 
provided by a trust is of course important, it does not mean that the investor has direct rights 
against an issuer, nor does it prevent the terms of contracts higher up the chain from having 
an impact on the investor’s rights. Certainly, investors should at least pay close attention to 
the contractual terms governing their relationship with the immediate intermediary, and in 
particular the powers that the contract may give the intermediary to deal with the subject 
matter of the trust. One recently-suggested means of managing expectations for bond 
investors, for example, is for ratings agencies to take into account the absence of direct rights 
against an issuer when rating an issue (see [2016] 3 JIBFL 153, 154). It may also be useful to 
bear in mind how investors may benefit both from personal claims against an intermediary 
(unavailable of course if holding assets directly) and, at least indirectly, from the systemic 
advantages of an intermediated system of holding (see Secure Capital [2015] EWHC 388 at 
[59]). 
Second, it is important to note that some developments in the general law of trusts may 
strengthen the position of an ultimate investor and align it more closely with an expectation 
of “economic ownership”. Indeed, those developments are noteworthy, and unorthodox, 
precisely because they seem to prefer a functional approach, focussing on the location of 
value, to the more traditional conceptual approach, which looks instead to the precise nature 
of a party’s rights. In Shell UK Ltd v Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 180, [2011] QB 86, for 
example, the defendant’s carelessness led to a large explosion at the Buncefield oil storage 
terminal which damaged fuel storage and pipeline facilities used by the claimant. The 
claimant suffered serious economic loss through its inability to supply fuel to its customers. 
Title to the land and facilities was however held by two service companies subject to a trust, 
and the claimant was one of the beneficiaries of that trust. The defendant’s argument, 
accepted at first instance and consistent with authorities such as The Aliakmon [1986] AC 785 
(HL), was that the claimant had no cause of action, as it had neither legal ownership nor 
possession of the damaged property. The Court of Appeal characterised the claimant’s loss as 
economic, but nonetheless found that the case fell within an exception to the general rule 
against recovery of pure economic loss, as the existence of the trust meant there was a 
“special relationship” (at [136]) between the claimant and the damaged property, and indeed 
that the claimant was “the ‘real’ owner”, so that it would be “legalistic” to deny recovery (at 
[132]). Recovery was therefore allowed, although subject to the requirement that the trustees 
should be joined in any action. The specific reasoning of the Court of Appeal can be attacked, 
as exceptions to the general bar on the recovery of pure economic loss are based on a special 
relationship between claimant and defendant, not between the claimant and some property. It 
is no surprise that such a conceptual point was overlooked, however, as the court’s emphasis 
was on the function of the trust, in allocating economic ownership of an asset, and showed a 
desire to protect such ownership against third party interference, thus aligning a real world 
expectation of “ownership” (however misinformed) with the legal outcome. The decision 
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may therefore be of interest where, for example, the economic interest of an investor is 
affected by the actions of a third party. If such a third party has acted carelessly in performing 
a contract with an intermediary, then, although the investor is not a party to such a contract, 
the terms of the contract may modify any duty of the third party to the investor: in cases 
involving recovery in tort of pure economic loss, the precise terms of an assumption of 
responsibility by the defendant can be critical (see e.g. White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) 
at 268), and to that extent, the burden of a intermediary-third party contract may have an 
effect on an investor, particularly where (as is often the case where the third party is a sub-
custodian), the investor has given the intermediary a wide power to enter into such relations 
with third parties (compare e.g. The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 (PC): even a claim 
of a legal owner of goods can be limited by the terms of a sub-bailment, if the power to make 
such sub-bailments was given by the owner to the initial bailee). 
A similar focus on economic “reality”, again producing effects which may be of interest to 
investors, is apparent in the recent judgments in Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus plc [2015] 
UKSC 66. The claimant bank had agreed to release its charge over the parents’ home on the 
basis that it would then acquire a charge over a new, smaller home to be bought by the 
parents. That smaller home was acquired in the name of a daughter and the charge apparently 
granted over it was invalid, as it had not been signed by the daughter. The Supreme Court 
held that the bank nonetheless had a security right: it could be subrogated to the unpaid 
vendor’s lien over the smaller home, as the purchase price of that home was paid using 
money which became available as a result of the bank’s agreement to release its charge over 
the parents’ home. The important point for present purposes is that the Supreme Court, 
viewing such a subrogation claim as based on unjust enrichment principles, also accepted 
(with the exception of Lord Carnwath) that such enrichment could be made out even if the 
bank could not show any proprietary right in the money used to buy the smaller home. Lord 
Clarke, for example, (at [32]) commended taking a “broad” approach to the question of 
whether there was a sufficient causal connection between the bank’s action and the 
acquisition of the smaller home, taking account of “ ‘economic’ or ‘commercial’ reality”. It 
might previously have been thought that, not least because the bank was arguing that it had a 
proprietary right, tracing principles would have to be met in order for the bank to establish 
the necessary connection. It seems, however, that this is not required to establish an unjust 
enrichment claim: the connection can be established without tracing through a set of 
identified transactions to identify one right as a product of another, as long as it can be said 
that the “economic reality” establishes a link between loss to one party and gain to another. 
This approach may thus assist an investor in making a claim against a third party, even if the 
complexity of the intermediary’s dealings, or a lack of segregation of assets, means that 
traditional tracing rules cannot be satisfied. Indeed, in his dissent in Lehman Bros 
International (Europe) v CRC [2012] UKSC 6, Lord Walker at [85] referred to the “very 
precarious form of protection” provided by a trust without segregation, owing to the risk that 
the “element of trust property in unsegregated funds will rapidly become untraceable”. The 
possible use of an unjust enrichment claim to bypass tracing requirements certainly appears 
to increase protection for some investors but, in a reflection of Lord Walker’s concerns in the 
Lehman case, it is not clear what effect such claims might have on those other investors who 
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can establish rights under the tracing rules, and nor is it clear that a “sufficiently close casual 
connection” test (particularly if applied as a second possibility, to be considered in addition to 
the tracing rules) will reduce the practical problems that arise when applying the approach 
preferred by the majority in Lehman (see [2015] 5 JIBFL 260). 
A third response is to try to meet an investor’s expectation of ownership by providing a new 
system of direct, rather than intermediated, holding of assets. It has been suggested that the 
technology behind cryptocurrencies might allow such direct holding to be combined with 
speedy, simple dealings (Micheler [2015] CLJ 505, 531-533): as bearer securities give rights 
to the holder of a document, so might cryptosecurities give rights to the party identified in a 
form of electronic register. It is again important to consider the wider law, in particular the 
causes of action available to an initial holder of a registered intangible who falls victim to a 
fraud. In Armstrong v Winnington [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), the deputy judge found that the 
claimant, initially registered as holding numbered EUAs (EU allowances to emit carbon 
dioxide), could bring a claim in knowing receipt against the defendant, which, as the result of 
a third party fraud, had been registered in place of the claimant as the holder of those EUAs. 
This depended, however, on the somewhat unconvincing proposition that, when gaining 
access to the claimant’s electronic account, the fraudster had gained such control over the 
claimant’s EUAs that it could be regarded as holding those rights on trust for the claimant. It 
was also said that, if the fraudster had no such rights, a proprietary restitutionary claim would 
have been available against the defendant, based on the claimant’s subsisting legal property 
right. The difficulty there, however, is in equating ownership of a physical thing with an 
intangible right: the latter right, unlike the former, does not, in itself, impose duties of non-
interference on third parties (see e.g. Your Response Ltd v Data Team Business Media [2014] 
EWCA Civ 281). The point is that it is not only the phenomenon of intermediation that may 
limit the rights of an investor; the nature of the underlying right itself may also have such an 
effect. 
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